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Abstract
We describe ongoing research towards mod-
elling dialogue management for conversa-
tional agents that can exhibit and cope with
non-cooperative behaviour. Empirical stud-
ies of conventional dialogue behaviour in the
domain of political interviews and a coarse-
grained notion of conversational games are
used to characterise non-cooperation. We pro-
pose an agent architecture that combines con-
versational games and discourse obligations,
and suggest an implementation.
1 Introduction
Consider the dialogue fragment in Figure 11. It
differs from typical political interviews, where one
of the participants poses more or less impartial
questions, while the other provides clear and rele-
vant answers. This type of dialogue eludes tradi-
tional approaches to computational dialogue mod-
elling which assume a strong notion of cooperation
between the participants. Joint intentions (Cohen
and Levesque, 1991) or shared plans (Grosz and Sid-
ner, 1990), for example, successfully explain situa-
tions in which dialogue participants recognise and
adopt each other’s intentions and goals.
Many naturally-occurring dialogues do, however,
not conform to these assumptions. Deviations
from conventional behaviour –such as loaded ques-
tions, evasive answers, unsolicited comments, etc.,
which we refer to as non-cooperative features (Plu¨ss,
2010)– do occur. Consequently, shedding light on
1BBC presenter Jeremy Paxman interviews MP George Gal-
loway after the UK 2005 General Election. Video: http:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=SlE5cTcYZbs.
Figure 1: General Election Night Interview (BBC, 2005)
the nature of non-cooperation in dialogue2 promises
to yield a better understanding of conversation, and
may eventually be of use in applications (e.g. role-
playing agents, sophisticated dialogue systems).
2 Conversational Games and Discourse
Obligations
Conversational (or dialogue) games extend speech
acts beyond the single utterance, spanning from two
sequential utterances to entire conversations (Power,
1979). Following Walton and Krabbe (1995), we use
a coarse-grained notion of conversational game that
refers to entire dialogue situations. At this level, a
game is seen as a set of rules, a contract participants
subscribe to by agreeing on a specific type of inter-
action. An informal example for a (simplified) po-
litical interview follows:
1. Two participants: an interviewer (IR) and an interviewee (IE).
2. IR limits herself to asking questions from a pre-agreed topical
agenda until the agenda is empty.
2We refer here to linguistic cooperation, as opposed to non-
linguistic (or task-level) cooperation. Plu¨ss (2010) presents a
discussion on this distinction.
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3. IE limits himself to providing relevant and complete answers
to questions until the IR ends the conversation.
4. Grounding:
- Adequate questions (i.e. in the topical agenda) are accepted.
- Inadequate questions are rejected.
- Irrelevant or incomplete replies are rejected.
- Relevant and complete answers are accepted.
5. After accepting an answer, IR moves on to the next question.
6. Once all questions have been addressed, IR initiates closing.
7. When IR initiates closing, IE completes and the dialogue ends.
These rules capture conventional behaviour un-
der a certain scenario, as participants are expected to
act according to the game’s rules. Discourse obliga-
tions resulting from such social pressure have been
used for modelling dialogue management (Traum
and Allen, 1994; Matheson et al., 2000). In the ex-
ample above, for instance, an adequate question im-
poses an obligation on the interviewee to accept it.
Discourse obligations follow naturally from con-
versational games and are associated with cooper-
ation. When obligations are addressed, the rules
of the game are followed and the result is coop-
erative behaviour (Traum and Allen, 1994). Non-
cooperative dialogue (e.g. the interaction in Figure
1) seems to be beyond the limits of such games. Of
course, one could add further rules that capture the
variations present in these conversations, but in the
limit this approach would require an additional set
of rules for each possible unconventional behaviour.
In our work, we use the insights from dialogue
games to provide a description of expected be-
haviour in the form of social obligations, but allow
agents to bend –or break– the rules. Our hypothesis
is that non-cooperative behaviour occurs when par-
ticipants favour individual goals that are in conflict
with their current discourse obligations.
3 Agent Architecture and Prototype
Implementation
We have implemented a prototype with two au-
tonomous agents holding an interview. We followed
an information state approach (Traum and Larsson,
2003), grouping update and selection rules accord-
ing to the architecture shown in Figure 2. The in-
formation state has the agenda of individual goals,
the dialogue history and pending obligations. The
agents keep the same knowledge about the game, so
as to track each other’s obligations, while individ-
ual goals are private. After each move, obligations
are updated and a deliberation mechanism decides
Figure 2: Agent architecture
whether to discharge an obligation or follow an in-
dividual goal, based on priority settings.
Current and future work include the development
of a good topical domain for the prototype and a
comprehensive evaluation.
4 Conclusion
Conversational games capture dialogue conventions,
but say little about deviations. By focusing on how
dialogue rules can be bent or broken we aim at pro-
ducing and coping with a wider range of behaviours.
References
P.R. Cohen and H.J. Levesque. 1991. Confirmations and
joint action. In Proceedings of the 12th International
Joint Conference on AI, Sydney, Australia.
B.J. Grosz and C.L. Sidner. 1990. Plans for discourse.
Intentions in communication, pages 417–444.
C. Matheson, M. Poesio, and D. Traum. 2000. Mod-
elling grounding and discourse obligations using up-
date rules. In Proceedings of the 1st NAACL Confer-
ence, San Francisco, CA, USA.
Brian Plu¨ss. 2010. Non-cooperation in dialogue. In Pro-
ceedings of the ACL 2010 Student Research Workshop,
ACL-SRW 2010, pages 1–6, Uppsala, Sweden.
R. Power. 1979. The organisation of purposeful dia-
logues. Linguistics, 17:107–152.
D.R. Traum and J.F. Allen. 1994. Discourse obligations
in dialogue processing. In Proceedings of the 32nd
annual meeting of ACL. Morristown, NJ, USA.
D. Traum and S. Larsson. 2003. The information state
approach to dialogue management. Current and New
Directions in Discourse and Dialogue, pages 325–353.
D. Walton and E. Krabbe. 1995. Commitment in di-
alogue: Basic concepts of interpersonal reasoning.
State University of New York Press.
213
